Central Africa by Convergne, Elodie
A number of important political and secu-
rity challenges confront countries in Central
Africa, illustrated most vividly by the rapid
emergence of a rebel coalition in the Central
African Republic (CAR), which gained con-
trol of approximately one-third of the country
by the end of 2012. Governance concerns, in-
cluding the lack of inclusive governance,
continue to present risks as both Burundi and
the CAR prepare for elections in the coming
years. In addition, despite important progress
in addressing security issues, the region is
threatened by the continued operations of the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
Background
While the UN Organization Stabilization Mis-
sion in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUSCO) is the region’s only large-scale
peacekeeping mission (see Mission Note 4.5),
Central Africa hosts three UN political mis-
sions supporting peace processes at various
stages. In addition to offices in the CAR and
Burundi, the UN in 2011 established its Of-
fice for Central Africa (UNOCA) to strengthen
regional conflict prevention mechanisms.
Based in Libreville, Gabon, UNOCA covers
the ten member states of the Economic Com-
munity of Central African States (ECCAS).1
The office’s main function is to promote a re-
gional approach to conflict prevention and
peacebuilding, in particular by carrying out
good offices on behalf of the Secretary-
 General and assisting subregional organiza-
tions. After some recruitment delays, UNOCA
is now fully staffed and has established part-
nerships with other UN actors as well as re-
gional organizations in order to fill its gaps in
thematic expertise. However, despite the Se-
curity Council’s strong support, it still lacks
financial resources and sufficient staff strength
to address the range of issues it is tasked to
deal with, and is thus partly reliant on extra-
budgetary funding.
The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office
in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)
was established in January 2010, replacing a
prior peacebuilding office,2 with the aim of
strengthening the coordination of UN activi-
ties in the country. The mission is mandated
to support implementation of the inclusive
political dialogue held after the signing of the
2008 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
between the government and all but one of
the major rebel groups. The mission focuses
on assisting the government in security sector
reform (SSR), in particular the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) pro -
cess, which is guided by a national DDR strat-
egy developed in mid-2011. The mission also
coordinates with the UN Peacebuilding Com-
mission, which is currently redefining its work-
ing relationship with the CAR on the basis of
its second poverty reduction strategy paper,
adopted in February 2012. 
Also in the CAR is the ECCAS Mission
for the Consolidation of Peace in Central
Africa (MICOPAX). Created in July 2008 to
replace the Multinational Force in Central
Africa (FOMUC), MICOPAX is mandated to
assist in restructuring the country’s security
forces, accompany the transition process to-
ward national reconciliation, and coordinate
humanitarian aid. Despite this rather compre-
hensive mandate, its staff is almost entirely
military. With a total staff of less than 700
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support from the EU and France, the mis-
sion’s capacities, and therefore its contribu-
tions, were limited for much of 2012. It has
nonetheless worked to mitigate the risk of
large-scale violence by acting as an interme-
diary between the rebel groups, the CAR
army, and local authorities. Its escort mis-
sions have also had deterrent effects, but are
insufficient to ensure the protection of civil-
ians in the north. 
The UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) was
authorized in 2011 to replace the larger UN In-
tegrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). BNUB is
expected to accompany the last phase of
peace consolidation before the return to nor-
malized UN engagement in Burundi. The mis-
sion is mandated, among other tasks, to sup-
port the government in strengthening national
institutions, facilitate dialogue between na-
tional actors, support the establishment of
transitional justice mechanisms, promote the
protection of human rights, and ensure that all
strategies and policies with respect to public
finance and the economic sector have a focus
on peacebuilding and equitable growth. The
swift replacement of former head of BNUB
Karin Landgren, who in April 2012 was ap-
pointed to lead the UN mission in Liberia,
with Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, prevented a
loss of mission momentum.
The Lord’s Resistance Army remains a
significant challenge for the region, and inter-
national attention on the group intensified in
2012 with the release of a controversial doc-
umentary on its leader, Joseph Kony. In No-
vember 2011 the African Union launched a
regional initiative against the LRA. The UN
also produced a regional strategy, in June
2012, aimed at enhancing cooperation be-
tween UN and regional actors against LRA
activities (see the box “The African Union’s
Efforts Against the Lord’s Resistance Army”).
Regional Developments
Following a request by the Security Council
in November 2011, UNOCA took the lead in
coordinating the development of a UN regional
strategy for humanitarian, development, and
peacebuilding assistance to LRA-affected
areas, in close coordination with the Afri can
Union (in particular its Special Envoy for the
LRA), UN missions and country teams in the
affected areas, and Central African states.
The strategy, endorsed by the Security Coun-
cil in June 2012, focuses on five key objec-
tives: implementation of the AU Regional
Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of
the LRA, protection of civilians, strengthening
of DDR activities, coordination of humanitar-
ian assistance and child protection programs,
and support to the affected countries in estab-
lishing state authority in their territories.3
UNOCA is also developing a regional
anti piracy strategy in the Gulf of Guinea in
cooperation with Central African and West
African regional actors, such as the UN Of-
fice for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). At the request of the Security
Council, UNOCA is also involved in the de-
sign of a systemwide strategy to address the
impact of the Libya crisis on the Sahel re-
gion, following the recommendations of a UN
interagency assessment mission conducted in
December 2011.
In keeping with its mandate to cooper-
ate with subregional organizations, UNOCA
adopted in May 2012 a framework coopera-
tion agreement with ECCAS to strengthen the
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latter’s conflict prevention and mediation
support capabilities. The two organizations,
together with the International Conference on
the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), are also de -
veloping a counterterrorism initiative.
Also supporting peace consolidation ef-
forts in the region are four AU liaison offices
in Central Africa, based in Burundi, the CAR,
Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Their activities range from conflict prevention,
management, and resolution to postconflict
reconstruction. The liaison offices are partic-
ularly active in supporting the implementa-
tion of peace agreements, and in monitoring
the implementation of AU Peace and Security
Council decisions at the national level.
Central African Republic
Despite positive signs of progress earlier in
the year, the emergence and rapid advance of
the Seleka rebel alliance in December 2012
dealt a significant blow to peace consolida-
tion efforts in the Central African Republic.
Governance and security in the CAR have
been weakened by repeated coups and ensu-
ing conflict since the end of the 1990s. The
January 2011 elections were held in a peace-
ful atmosphere, but the runoff elections two
months later were boycotted by the opposi-
tion and thus did not serve to reduce the po-
litical tension between the ruling party and
the opposition. However, the political process
made significant progress in the second half
of 2012. Consultations between the govern-
ment and various political parties, supported
by BINUCA, the African Union, and the Or-
ganisation Internationale de la Francophonie,
led to the adoption by consensus of a new
elections management body in September
2012, followed by the approval of a new draft
electoral code. Despite this major political
breakthrough, the continued restrictions on
the rights of the opposition continue to pose a
challenge to political stability.
On 25 August, the Convention of Patriots
for Justice and Peace (CPJP) rebel group ac-
ceded to the CPA—the final rebel group to
join the peace process. This development, to-
gether with the European Union’s provision
in May 2012 of 4 million euros,4 allowed for
the extension of the DDR process in north-
eastern CAR, which also includes former
combatants from other major rebel groups.
With technical assistance from BINUCA and
the UN Development Programme (UNDP),
and in cooperation with the World Bank, the
DDR process resumed in the northwestern
and northern-central regions in mid-2012.
Though the DDR exercise benefited from the
relative improvement of security conditions
in the country, its future implementation is
uncertain due to security issues posed by the
new rebellion, as well as funding gaps that
reached a deficit of $20 million in May.5
The surge in human rights violations re-
ported by BINUCA throughout 2012 high-
lights the urgent need for progress on the
SSR front, which still lacks a national strat-
egy. A roadmap for the revival of the SSR
process, developed with strong technical sup-
port from BINUCA, was adopted in Febru-
ary.6 The Security Council identified as a
cause for “deep concern” the numerous cases
of summary executions, torture, and arbitrary
arrests perpetrated by security and defense
forces, as well as the instances of harassment
and extortion of the population in areas con-
trolled by armed groups.7
These developments underscored the ex-
isting weaknesses of the security environ-
ment when on 10 December, the Seleka rebel
alliance launched attacks in northeastern
CAR, quickly capturing the city of Bria and
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extending to cover nearly one-third of the
country. The alliance is made up of factions
of three rebel groups united in their opposi-
tion to President Bozizé and his perceived
failure to implement the 2008 peace agree-
ment. In response, and at Bozizé’s request,
the government of Chad agreed to send 2,000
troops to halt the rebels’ advance. The presi-
dent also requested assistance from the United
States and France, but neither country was will-
ing to intervene. As a result of the violence,
the UN temporarily evacuated non essen tial
staff and the United States closed its embassy
in Bangui.
The ECCAS held a summit on 21 De-
cember where it put forth a roadmap to bring
an end to the crisis, including a cease-fire and
immediate negotiations, and agreed to further
reinforce MICOPAX to turn it into an inter-
position force. The UN Secretary-General and
Security Council both strongly condemned
the rebels’ activities and called for the imple-
mentation of the ECCAS roadmap. BINUCA
engaged with both the government and rebels
to establish a dialogue and cease-fire.
In late December, the Seleka alliance
halted their advance and agreed to enter into
peace talks with the government beginning in
early January, following President Bozizé’s
pledge to form a coalition government in-
cluding members of the rebel group. As nego-
tiations began in January the security envi-
ronment remained precarious.
In addition, the LRA continues its opera-
tions in the CAR, where its leader, Joseph
Kony, is believed to be hiding, and the coun-
try saw a spike in attacks in the first half of
2012. In light of the growing threat of the
Ugandan rebel group, in December 2011 the
Security Council designated BINUCA as a
focal point for LRA-related activities. In ad-
dition to its participation in the UN regional
strategy against the LRA, BINUCA also con-
tributes to the drafting of a national strategy
on the issue, which has yet to be adopted by
the government. It also supports activities to
encourage the defection and reintegration of
LRA combatants. In the framework of the AU
initiative against the LRA, BINUCA provides
logistical support to the AU delegations trav-
eling to the affected areas, and has recruited
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two consultants based in Obo as part of the
AU Joint Intelligence and Operations Center.
Burundi
Though BNUB is intended to be the final
mission before a return to normalized UN
Country Team engagement, it inherited a po-
larized political situation following a boycott
of the 2010 elections by major opposition
parties, some of whose leaders left the coun-
try. These elections marked the second polls
since the signing of the Arusha Accords in
2000, which provided for a new constitution
and a power-sharing agreement to mitigate
interethnic conflict.
To facilitate dialogue between political ac-
tors ahead of the 2015 elections, BNUB pro-
vides technical support on topics such as civil
society development, electoral preparedness,
and press freedom. The mission also conducts
quiet political engagement with senior gov-
ernment and opposition leaders in Burundi
and abroad. Meetings between ruling-party
officials and extraparliamentary opposition
members over the past year, together with the
return from Belgium of opposition spokesman
Pancrace Cimpaye in July, were positive steps.
However, despite a modest decrease in 2012,
the persistence of extrajudicial killings and
cases of torture serve as reminders that polit-
ical violence remains too frequent an alterna-
tive to dialogue. The strong language on ex-
trajudicial killings and accountability for past
human rights violations in Security Council
Resolution 2027 applied helpful pressure.
Implementation of a transitional justice
mechanism has slowed again since 2011, when
the government, with significant support from
BNUB, set up a technical committee to elab-
orate a draft law to establish a truth and rec-
onciliation commission. Given the new delay,
questions arise as to whether such a commis-
sion could complete its work before the be-
ginning of the 2015 electoral campaign.
This issue also highlights the deficiencies
in the justice sector, the strengthening of
which is one of BNUB’s main focuses. The
mission, together with UNDP and the UN
Country Team, is also providing technical
and financial support and training to promote
the accountability of magistrates and the in-
dependence of judicial institutions, including
the national human rights commission and of-
fice of the ombudsman. However, progress in
strengthening the rule of law is hampered by
the mixed results of police reform, where
human rights abuses and relative lack of pop-
ular confidence stand in contrast to the suc-
cess of army integration and reform.
Progress has been more visible in the so-
cioeconomic sphere, where the government
adopted its second poverty reduction strategy
paper in February 2012, with strong support
from international partners. These develop-
ments have reopened the question of whether
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In November 2011 the African Union,
with support from the United Nations,
United States, and European Union,
launched a comprehensive approach to
combat the notorious rebel group Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA). The AU Re-
gional Cooperation Initiative for the
Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) was
authorized by the Peace and Security
Council on 22 November and officially
launched the following March in Juba. It
is mandated to build the operational ca-
pacities of the countries affected by the
LRA, to establish an environment con-
ducive to the stabilization of the affected
areas, and to facilitate the delivery of hu-
manitarian assistance. The AU Special
Envoy for the LRA issue, Francisco Cae-
tano José Madeira, was appointed on 23
November 2011. He is tasked with coor-
dinating and monitoring the implementa-
tion of the AU strategy against the LRA.
The RCI-LRA has three components.
First, the Joint Coordination Mech anism
is an ad hoc structure comprising the
ministers of defense of the affected coun-
tries, chaired by the AU Commissioner
for Peace and Security. Headquartered in
Bangui, the mechanism is responsible
for political and strategic coordination.
Second, the Regional Intervention Force,
also known as the  Regional Task Force,
is the military component, tasked with
capturing LRA combatants. At full de-
ployment, it will comprise 5,000 sol-
diers drawn from the Central African
Republic (CAR), the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and
Uganda. It is headquartered in Yambio,
South Sudan, with three sector bases, in
Dungu (DRC), Obo (CAR), and Nzara
(South Sudan). Nearly 3,000 troops have
been committed to date, though not all
of these troops are operational due to
 logistical issues. Finally, the Joint Intel-
ligence and Operations Center will un-
dertake integrated planning and monitor-
ing of the operations under the authority
of the Regional Task Force. The center
comprises a total of thirty officers sec-
onded by the affected countries.1
The AU initiative is supported by
international partners, in particular the
United States, which sent 100 military
advisers to Uganda in October 2011, and
the European Union, which pledged 9
million euros in humanitarian assistance
to LRA victims in March 2012.2 The
AU’s efforts are also a key focus of the
UN regional strategy against the LRA, 
which is centered on the UN system but
designed in close cooperation with the
AU. The AU Special Envoy accompa-
nied the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the UN Office in
Central Africa in his travels to affected
countries, and participated in coordinat-
ing the drafting of the UN strategy, com-
pleted in June 2012.
The RCI-LRA entered its opera-
tional phase in the summer of 2012, but
it is unclear whether it will overcome its
lack of funding and coordinated leader-
ship amid a climate of tensions between
the national armies it brings together.
The African Union’s Efforts Against the Lord’s Resistance Army
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Burundi, one of the first countries on the UN
Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, should
finally “graduate” from commission support,
as suggested by its government.
The future transition back to regular UN
Country Team engagement is also up for
 debate, to be informed by the benchmarks
 presented by the Secretary-General to the
 Security Council in May 2012, which meas-
ure progress toward accomplishing BNUB’s
mandate and broader peace consolidation in
Burundi, including democratic process, tran-
sitional justice, institution building, and human
rights. The Security Council, the government
of Burundi, and the Secretary-General will
need to reach a consensus on whether this
transition should take place before the 2015
elections, as called for by the government, or
after, as some Council members have already
mooted.
Conclusion
The security environment has stabilized in im-
portant ways in Burundi and the wider region.
However, critical security and political chal-
lenges remain, illustrated most dramatically by
events in the CAR as the year came to a close.
How governments choose to approach these
issues will largely determine future stability
in the region. Funding gaps affecting national
efforts in security sector reform and interre-
lated efforts to mitigate threats posed by
armed rebel groups operating across the re-
gion have also hampered progress in these
areas. It remains to be seen whether the recent
parallel initiatives launched by the AU and
UN to combat the LRA will be effective in
harnessing thinly spread resources, or will
lead to a resource strain through duplication
of efforts.
Notes
1. ECCAS members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
2. For further information, see Center on International Cooperation, Review of Political Missions
2010 (New York, 2010).
3. Tasked to coordinate implementation of the strategy, UNOCA organized a first workshop of
donors and the LRA focal points in Entebbe in July 2012, which adopted a set of priorities designed to
form the basis of a programmatic document.
4. According to interviews with mission staff.
5. These funding gaps were partially ameliorated by the provision of $2.4 million by the UN Peace-
building Fund and the $10 million pledged by ECCAS.
6. The roadmap envisages the elaboration of six subsectoral strategies to be consolidated into a
three-year national SSR strategy. Among them, the substrategies on the armed forces and the gen-
darmerie, and on democratic oversight, have been finalized, and the design of the substrategy on the po-
lice is receiving additional support from the Security Sector Reform Unit of the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations. The substrategies on the justice sector, decentralization, and environmental
protection, and on public finance and customs, have yet to be drafted. See United Nations, Report of the
Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and on the Activities of the United
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that Country, UN Doc. S/2012/374, 2012.
7. United Nations, Department of Public Information, Security Council Press Statement on Cen-
tral African Republic, UN Doc. SC/10665-AFR/2400, 2012.
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